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Abstract
Two key components of the upcoming health reform in the U.S. are a new
regulation of the individual health insurance market and an increase in in-
come redistribution in the economy. Which component contributes more to
the welfare outcome of the reform? We address this question by construct-
ing a general equilibrium life cycle model that incorporates both medical
expenses and labor income risks. We replicate the key features of the current
health insurance system in the U.S. and calibrate the model using the Medical
Expenditures Panel Survey dataset. We nd that the reform decreases the
number of uninsured more than twice and generates substantial welfare gains.
However, these welfare gains mostly come from the redistributive measures
embedded in the reform. If the reform only reorganizes the individual mar-
ket, introduces individual mandates but does not include any income-based
transfers, the welfare gains are much smaller. This result is mostly driven by
the fact that most uninsured people have low income.
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1 Introduction
In Spring of 2010 the President of the U.S. signed the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act which culminated a long and vigorous health reform debate. This bill
introduces a wide range of measures aiming primarily to increase health insurance cov-
erage. In particular, the bill substantially changes the rules under which the individual
insurance market operates and introduces penalties for those without insurance. At the
same time it contains a set of measures that increase income redistribution in the econ-
omy. The goal of this paper is to provide a quantitative analysis of the upcoming reform
in order to isolate the welfare eects of the new regulation of the individual market from
the eects of the increased income redistribution.
To do this, we construct a general equilibrium life cycle model where agents face
two types of risks: uninsurable labor income risk and persistent medical expenses risk
that can be partially insured. People with high medical expenses have higher disutility
from work and suer a loss in productivity. We allow agents to be heterogeneous by
educational level (exogenously xed), which aects their ability to generate income and
to access employer-based health insurance.
We replicate the key features of the current health insurance system. First, in our
model the insurance system consists of three components: individual market, employer-
based market, and public insurance. Second, public insurance is available only to the
lowest-income individuals, while people with high income are more likely to get employer-
based coverage. Third, the majority of the uninsured can obtain insurance only from the
individual market because they do not have access to the employer-based market and are
not eligible for public insurance. At the same time this group of people tends to have low
income. Fourth, public insurance is free and employer-based premiums are community
rated. Those who purchase insurance in the individual market face risk-rated premiums
that depend on their current medical shock. After calibrating the model to the key facts
of the U.S. insurance system using the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey, we introduce
the changes specied in the Patient Protection and Aordable Care Act (hereafter called
the Bill).
These changes can be broadly divided into two groups. First, there is a new reg-
ulation of the individual health insurance market that aims to create a risk-pooling
mechanism outside the employer-sponsored market. In particular, insurance companies
will be banned from conditioning premiums on individuals' health status or history of
claims. The price of an insurance policy can only vary by age. This restriction is known
as age-adjusted community rating. To prevent cream-skimming by insurers, another pro-
vision in the Bill is guaranteed issue which prevents insurance companies from denying
coverage to individuals based on their health status. A possible outcome of a combination
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of community rating with guaranteed issue is an adverse selection spiral and to prevent
this, the Bill requires all individuals without health insurance to pay a penalty unless
the insurance premium constitutes too high a proportion of their income.
Second, the Bill includes a set of redistributional measures. In particular, the Bill
includes provisions to expand Medicaid. Currently, Medicaid covers several categories of
population (for instance, adults with dependent children, pregnant women) with income
below a threshold that varies signicantly from state to state.1 After the reform all
people under 65 years old with income below 133% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL)
will become eligible for Medicaid. Also low-income people will be able to get subsidies
when buying insurance in the individual market. The goal of the subsidy is to keep
premiums people pay for a standard insurance policy below a prespecied percentage of
their income.
When evaluating the welfare eects of the reform, as a welfare criteria we use the
average utility of people who are alive at the beginning of the reform and live through
the transition period. This welfare function favors redistribution across people with dif-
ferent income net of medical expenses. The reform introduces two additional channels
of redistribution in the economy: rst, from the healthy to the sick (through commu-
nity rating in the individual market); second, from the high-income to the low-income
(through subsidies and Medicaid expansion). Since neither of these new redistributional
mechanisms is conditioned on income net of medical expenses, the resulting welfare eect
of each mechanism is unclear: any redistribution from the healthy to the sick involves
some redistribution from the healthy who are poor to the sick who are rich. Similarly
every redistribution from the rich to the poor will involve some redistribution from the
rich who are sick to the poor who are healthy. To adequately gauge the welfare eects of
these redistributive channels we need to carefully capture the correlation between labor
income and medical expenses. We do this by explicitly accounting for the fact that people
with high medical expenses have lower productivity and lower labor supply.
We nd that the reform has a large eect on the fraction of the uninsured in the
economy: this number decreases from 19.7% to 8.9%. The reform has the largest eect
on young people in the lowest educational group, with the fraction of uninsured among
high-school dropouts aged between 25 to 29 years old decreasing from 61.2% to 7.5%.
Also the reform induces more participation in the individual market with the fraction of
individually insured increasing from 7.3% to 18.5%.
In terms of welfare, we nd that the reform brings substantial gains equivalent to
0.64% of the annual consumption. However, these welfare gains mostly come from the
1As of 2009, 17 states had a Medicaid eligibility threshold below 50% of the Federal Poverty Line
(FPL), 17 states had it between 50 to 99% FPL, and 17 states had it higher than 100% FPL (Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2010).
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redistributive measures embedded in the reform. If the reform is implemented without
subsidies and Medicaid expansion, its welfare eects are signicantly smaller.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Welfare gains from the reform are largely
driven by the change in the welfare of low-income people. For the majority of this group,
insurance premiums constitute a high fraction of income and they gain a lot from having
subsidized coverage. On the other hand, the new regulation of the individual market
by itself has a limited eect on health insurance aordability for low-income people who
often prefer to stay uninsured if not subsidized.
Our paper is related to the literature on dynamic general equilibrium models with het-
erogeneous agents and incomplete markets (Imrohoroglu, 1989; Hugget, 1993; Aiyagari,
1994). We belong to the branch of this literature that augments the standard incomplete
market model with an idiosyncratic health expenditure risk. For example, Attanasio,
Kitao, and Violante (2011) evaluate general equilibrium eects of dierent Medicare re-
forms; Kopecky and Koreshkova (2011) study the eect of medical and nursing home
expenses on wealth accumulation over a life-cycle. The closest paper to ours is Jeske
and Kitao (2009) who study tax subsidies for employer-based health insurance in the
environment where private health insurance markets are explicitly modeled. Comparing
to Jeske and Kitao (2009), our model introduces endogenous labor supply, public health
insurance and also has more dimensions of heterogeneity of individuals: we allow for a full
life-cycle and dierent educational levels. This augmented heterogeneity is important for
studying the health insurance reform because of its potentially signicant redistributive
consequences.
Our paper is also related to the literature studying dierent versions of health in-
surance reform in the U.S. Feng (2009) studies the macroeconomic consequences of four
alternative reform proposals. Hansen et al (2011) analyze the reform that expands Medi-
care towards people aged 55-64 years old. Close to ours are Janicki (2011) and Jung and
Tran (2011) who also study the current health reform. In contrast to these two studies,
our focus is welfare decomposition between the two key components of the reform: the
new regulation of the individual market and income redistribution. Their framework
does not allow for such decomposition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 describes
the changes introduces by the reform. Section 4 explains our calibration. Section 5
compares the performance of the model with the empirical facts about the U.S. insurance
system. Section 6 describes the quantitative eects of the reform and decomposes its
welfare eects. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Baseline Model
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Demographics and preferences
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals. An individual
lives to a maximum of N periods. During the rst R   1 periods of life an individual
can choose whether to work or not; at age R all individuals retire. We denote the labor
supply decision of a household by lt, lt 2

0; l
	
.2
Agents are endowed with one unit of time that can be used for either leisure or work.
There is a xed cost of work t;e treated as a loss of leisure. Thus working individuals'
leisure time can be expressed as 1   l   t;e. The xed cost of work depends on age
(t) and education (e). In addition, individuals in bad health incur higher costs of work:
t;e = 1(t; e) + 2(t; e)1fhealth=badg where 1f:g is an indicator function mapping to one if
its argument is true, while 1(t; e) and 2(t; e) are non-negative functions.
We assume Cobb-Douglas specication for preferences over consumption and leisure3:
u(ct; lt) =

ct
 
1  lt   t;e1flt>0g
1 1 
1   :
Here  is a parameter determining the relative importance of consumption, and  is the
risk-aversion over the consumption-leisure composite.
Agents discount the future at the rate  and survive till the next period with condi-
tional probability t, which depends on age and health. We assume that the savings (net
of out-of-pocket medical expenses) of each household who does not survive are equally
allocated among all survived agents of a working age within the same educational group.
The population grows at the rate .
2.1.2 Health expenditures and health insurance
Each period an agent faces a stochastic medical expenditure shock xt. Medical shocks
evolve according to a Markov chain G(xt+1jxt; t). We categorize individuals into two
groups according to their medical expenses. Individuals with low medical expenses (xt 
xt) are referred to as `healthy' or `people in good health', while individuals with high
2Using the MEPS dataset we nd that the working hours proles for the employed are not much
dierent among people with dierent educational attainment or dierent medical expenses. However,
there are noticeable dierences in their labor force participation proles. Similar patterns are reported
by French (2005). Because of this we focus on the extensive margin for labor supply adjustment.
3We experimented with additive functional forms, however, the Cobb-Douglas form provides a no-
ticeably better match of the life-cycle labor supply proles for each health and educational group.
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medical expenses (xt > xt) are referred to as `unhealthy' or `people in bad health'. Here
xt is a threshold separating people into these two groups.
Every individual of working age can buy health insurance (HI) against a medical
shock in the individual health insurance market. The price of health insurance in the
individual market is a function of an agent's current medical shock and age, and is
denoted by pI (xt; t).
Every period with some probability Probt an agent of working age gets an oer to buy
employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI). The variable gt characterizes the status of
the oer: gt = 1 if an individual gets an oer, and gt = 0 if he does not. All participants
of the employer-based pool are charged the same premium p regardless of their current
medical expenses and age. An employer pays a fraction  of this premium. If the worker
chooses to buy group insurance, he only pays p where:
p = (1   ) p:
Low-income individuals of working age can obtain their health insurance from Med-
icaid for free. There are two pathways to qualify for Medicaid. First, an individual can
become eligible if his total income is below threshold ycat. Second, an individual can
become eligible through the Medically Needy program. This happens if his total income
minus medical expenses is below threshold yneed and his assets are less than the limit
kpub:4
We use it to index the current health insurance status as follows:
it =
8><>:
0 ; if uninsured
1 ; if insured by Mediciad
2 ; if privately insured
9>=>;
All types of insurance contracts - group, individual, and public - provide only partial
insurance against medical expenditure shocks. We denote by q (xt; it) the fraction of
medical expenditures covered by the insurance contract. This fraction is a function of
medical expenditures and the type of insurance a household has.
All retired households are enrolled in the Medicare program. The Medicare program
charges a xed premium of pmed and covers a fraction qmed (xt) of medical costs.
4As of 2009 35 states operate the Medically Needy program. All states running this program have
asset tests when determining eligibility. As for the general Medicaid program, most of the states do not
have asset tests as part of the eligibility requirement (Ross et al, 2009, and Kaiser Family Foundation
statistics available at www.statehealthfacts.org).
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2.1.3 Labor income
Households dier by their educational attainment e. Educational attainment can
take two values: e = 1 corresponds to the absence of any degree, e = 2 corresponds to
at least a high-school degree.5 Earnings are equal to ewze;xt lt, where ew is wage and ze;xt is
the idiosyncratic productivity that depends on educational level (e), age (t) and medical
expenses (xt) of an individual.
2.1.4 Taxation and social transfers
All households pay income taxes that consist of two parts: a progressive tax denoted
by T (yt) and a proportional tax denoted by  y.6 Taxable income yt is based on both labor
and capital income. Working households also pay payroll taxes - Medicare tax (med)
and Social Security tax ( ss). The Social Security tax rate for earnings above yss is zero.
The U.S. tax code allows households to subtract out-of-pocket medical expenditures that
exceed 7:5% of their income when the taxable income is calculated. In addition, ESHI
premium (p) is tax-deductible in both income and payroll tax calculations. Consumption
is taxed at a proportional rate  c.
We also assume a public safety-net program, T SIt : The program guarantees that every
household will have a minimum consumption level at c: This reects the option available
to U.S. households with a bad combination of income and medical shocks to rely on
public transfer programs such as food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, and un-
compensated care.7 Retired households receive Social Security benets sse that depend
on educational attainment e.
2.1.5 Optimization problem
Households of a working age (t < R) The state variables for the working age
household's optimization problem are capital (kt 2 K =R+ [ f0g), medical cost shock
(xt 2 X =R+ [ f0g), idiosyncratic labor productivity (ze;xt 2 Z =R+), ESHI oer sta-
tus (gt 2 G = f0; 1g), health insurance status (it 2 I = f0; 1; 2g), educational attainment
(e 2 E = f1; 2g) and age (t).
5In the earlier version of this paper (Pashchenko and Porapakkarm, 2011) we considered three educa-
tional groups: high-school dropouts, high-school graduates and college graduates. The rst educational
group diers substantially from the other two in insurance statistics, but the dierence between high-
school and college graduates is small. Because of this we combined the last two educational groups to
reduce the computational costs.
6The progressive part T (yt) approximates the actual income tax schedule in the U.S., while the
proportional tax represents all other taxes that we do not model explicitly. In this approach we follow
Jeske and Kitao (2009).
7In 2004 85% of uncompensated care were paid by the government. The major portion is sourced
from the disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payment (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004).
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In each period a household chooses consumption (ct), labor supply (lt) ; savings (kt+1) ;
and health insurance status for the next period (i0H). If he is eligible for Medicaid, he can
get free public insurance (we call this option M). If he works in a rm oering an ESHI,
he can buy a group insurance (G) : In addition, everyone can choose to be uninsured (U),
or buy individual insurance (I). We can summarize insurance choices as follows.8 If an
individual is eligible for Medicaid:
i0H =
(
fM; I;Gg ; if gt = 1 and lt > 0
fM; Ig ; if gt = 0 or lt = 0
)
: (1)
Otherwise
i0H =
(
fU; I;Gg ; if gt = 1 and lt > 0
fU; Ig ; if gt = 0 or lt = 0
)
: (2)
The value function of a working-age individual can be written as follows:
Vt;e (kt; xt; z
e;x
t ; gt; it) = max
kt+1;ct;lt;i0H
u (ct; lt) + tEtVt+1;e
 
kt+1; xt+1; z
e;x
t+1; gt+1;it+1

(3)
subject to
kt (1 + r) + ew ze;xt lt + T SIt +Beqe = (1 +  c) ct + kt+1 + xt (1  q (xt; it)) + Pt + Tax (4)
ew = ( w ; if gt = 0
(w   cE) ; if gt = 1
)
(5)
Pt =
8><>:
0 ; if i0H 2 fU;Mg
pI (xt; t) ; if i
0
H = I
p ; if i0H = G
9>=>; (6)
it+1 =
8><>:
0 ; if i0H = U
1 ; if i0H = M
2 ; if i0H 2 fI;Gg
9>=>; (7)
Tax = T (yt)+ yyt+med
ewze;xt lt   p1fi0H=Gg+ ssmaxewze;xt lt   p1fi0H=Gg; yss (8)
yt = rkt + ewze;xt lt   p1fi0H=Gg  max (0; xt (1  q (xt; it))  0:075 ( ewze;xt lt + rkt)) (9)
T SIt = max (0; (1 +  c) c+ xt (1  q (xt; it)) + Tax  ewze;xt lt   kt (1 + r) Beqe) : (10)
8An individual can buy an ESHI coverage through his/her spouse's employer. Since we abstract from
family structure, only those who work can buy ESHI in our model. In addition, since Medicaid is free,
Medicaid-eligible person cannot stay uninsured.
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An individual is eligible for Medicaid if(
ytott  ycat or
ytott   xt (1  q (xt; it))  yneed and kt  kpub
)
ytott = rkt + ew ze;xt lt
Beqe is accidental bequest. The conditional expectation on the right-hand side of
Equation (3) is over

xt+1; z
e;x
t+1; gt+1
	
: Equation (4) is the budget constraint. In Equation
(5), w is wage per eective labor unit. If the household has an ESHI oer, his employer
pays part of his insurance premium. To maintain zero prot condition, the employer who
oers ESHI deducts an amount cE from the wage per eective labor unit, as shown in
(5). Equation (7) maps the current HI choice into the next period HI status. In Equation
(8) ; the rst two terms are income taxes and the last two terms are payroll taxes.9
Retired households For a retired household (t  R) the state variables are capital
(kt), medical expenses shock (xt), educational attainment (e), and age (t).
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Vt;e (kt; xt) = max
kt+1;ct
u (ct; 0) + tEtVt+1;e (kt+1; xt+1) (11)
subject to
kt (1 + r) + sse + T
SI
t = (1 +  c) ct + kt+1 + xt (1  qmed (xt)) + pmed + Tax
Tax = T (yt) +  yyt
yt = rkt + sse  max (0; xt (1  qmed (xt))  0:075 (sse + rkt))
T SIt = max (0; (1 +  c) c+ xt (1  qmed (xt)) + Tax+ pmed   sse   kt (1 + r)) :
Distribution of households To simplify the notation, let S dene the space of a
household's state variables, where S = K  Z  XG  I  E  T for working-age
households and S = KXET for retired households. Let s 2 S, and denote by  (s)
the distribution of households over the state-space.
9In practice, employers contribute 50% of Medicare and Social Security taxes. For simplicity, we
assume that employees pay 100% of payroll taxes.
10The problem of a just retired household is slightly dierent since he is still under insurance coverage
from the previous period. Thus, it is an additional state variable and out-of-pocket medical expenses
are xt (1  q (xt; it)).
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2.2 Production sector
There are two stand-in rms which act competitively. Their production functions are
Cobb-Douglas, AKL1 ; where K and L are aggregate capital and aggregate labor and
A is the total factor productivity. The rst stand-in rm oers ESHI to its workers but
the second stand-in rm does not. Under competitive behavior, the second rm pays
each employee his marginal product of labor. Since capital is freely allocated between
the two rms, the Cobb-Douglas production function implies that the capital-labor ratios
of both rms are the same. Consequently, we have
w = (1  )AKL ; (12)
r = AK 1L1    ; (13)
where  is the depreciation rate.
The rst rm has to partially nance the health insurance premium for its employees.
These costs are passed on to its employees through a wage reduction. In specifying this
wage reduction, we follow Jeske and Kitao (2009) : The rst rm subtracts an amount
cE from the marginal product per eective labor unit. The zero prot condition implies
cE =
 p
R
1fi0H(s)=Gg  (s)

R
ltz
e;x
t 1fgt=1g  (s)
: (14)
The numerator is the total contributions towards insurance premiums paid by the rst
rm. The denominator is the total eective labor working in the rst rm.11
2.3 Insurance sector
Health insurance companies in both private and group markets act competitively.
We assume that insurers can observe all state variables that determine future medical
expenses of the individuals.12 This assumption, together with zero prot conditions,
allows us to write insurance premiums in the following way:
pI (xt; t) = (1 + r)
 1EM (xt; t) +  (15)
11The assumed structure implies a proportional transfer from high-income to low-income workers. An
alternative structure is a lump-sum wage reduction. This alternative structure is dicult to implement
in our setup since some workers will end up earning zero or negative wage.
12Currently most states allow insurance rms to medically underwrite applicants for health insurance.
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for the non-group insurance market and
p = (1 + r) 1

R
1fi0H(s)=GgEM (xt; t)   (s)

R
1fi0H(s)=Gg  (s)
(16)
for the group insurance market. Here, EM (xt; t) is the expected medical cost of an
individual of age t and with current medical costs xt that will be covered by the insurance
company:
EM (xt; t) =
Z
xt+1q (xt+1; 2)G(xt+1jxt; t):
 is a markup on prices due to the administrative costs in the individual and group
markets;  is the xed costs of buying an individual policy.13 The premium in the non-
group insurance market is based on the discounted expected medical expenditure of an
individual buyer. The premium for group insurance is based on a weighted average of
the expected medical costs of those who buy group insurance.
2.4 Government constraint
We assume that the government runs a balanced budget. This impliesZ
[Tax (s) +  cct (s)]   (s) G = (17)Z
tR
[sse + qmed (xt)xt   pmed]   (s) +
Z
T SIt   (s) +
Z
t<R
1fi0H=Mgq (xt; 1)xt  (s)
The left-hand side is the total tax revenue from all households net of the exogenous
government expenditures (G). The rst term on the right-hand side is the net expen-
ditures on Social Security and Medicare for retired households. The second term is the
costs of guaranteeing the minimum consumption oor for households. The last term is
the costs of Medicaid.
2.5 Denition of stationary competitive equilibrium
Given the government programs

c; sse; qmed (xt) ; pmed; y
cat; yneed; kpub; G
	
, the frac-
tion of medical costs covered by private insurers and Medicaid fq (xt; it)g ; and the em-
ployers' contribution ( ) ; the competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of the set
of time-invariant prices fw; r; p; pI (xt; t)g, wage reduction fcEg, households' value func-
tions fVt;e (s)g ; decision rules of working-age households fkt+1 (s) ; ct (s) ; lt (s) ; i0H (s)g
13Fixed costs capture the dierence in overhead costs for individual and group policies. An alternative
setup would be to assume dierent proportional loads . We choose xed costs because they allow us
to better match the life-cycle prole of individual insurance rates.
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and retired households fct (s) ; kt+1 (s)g and the tax functions fT (y) ; med;  ss;  c;  yg
such that the following conditions are satised:
1. Given the set of prices and the tax functions, the decision rules solve the households'
optimization problems in equations (3) and (11).
2. Wage (w) and rent (r) satisfy equation (12) and (13) ; where
K =
Z
kt+1 (s)   (s) +
Z
t<R
h
1fi0H(s)=Ggp+ 1fi0H(s)=Ig(pI (x; t)  )
i
  (s) ;
L =
Z
t<R
ze;xt lt (s)   (s) :
3. cE satises equation (14), thus the rm oering ESHI earns zero prot.
4. The non-group insurance premiums pI (xt; t) satisfy equation (15), and the group
insurance premium satises equation (16), so health insurance companies earn zero
prot.
5. The tax functions fT (y) ; med;  ss;  c;  yg balance the government budget (17).
3 Changes introduced by the reform
This section describes the modications we introduce to the baseline model after the
reform. When modeling the reform, we assume that there is no response from produc-
tion rms. In other words, the probability of getting an ESHI oer and the employer
contribution rate ( ) do not change after the reform.14 This assumption is relaxed in the
Appendix G.
3.1 Household problem
After the reform, a working-age household may be subject to penalties if he stays unin-
sured or may receive subsidies to buy individual health insurance. Also, more households
14This assumption results from the absence of consensus in the literature about rms' response to the
reform. Some economists express concern that the reform will induce many small rms to drop coverage
due to the availability of subsidized insurance for their employees in the individual market. On the other
hand, Brugemann and Manovskii (2010) show in a quantitative model that the number of rms oering
coverage may increase. Another view suggests that the reform will not change the number of rms
oering coverage. The Bill requires rms with more than 50 employees to pay penalties if they do not
oer coverage. However, 96% of rms with more than 50 employees already oer coverage and among
rms with more than 200 employees this number goes up to 99%. Also, the Bill allows for tax credits
for rms with less than 25 employees who oer health insurance coverage to their workers. However,
these tax credits are only in eect for two years.
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will be eligible for Medicaid. The eligibility for subsidies and the Medicaid expansion
depends on a household's total income (ytott ); penalties are a function of the taxable in-
come (yt). We can rewrite the budget constraint of a working-age household (4) in the
following way:
kt (1 + r) + ew ze;xt lt + T SIt +Beqe + Sub(ytott ; i0H) = (1 +  c) ct + kt+1+
xt (1  q (xt; it)) + Pt + Tax+ Pen(yt; i0H): (18)
Here Sub(ytott ; i
0
H) and Pen(yt; i
0
H) are subsidies and penalties correspondingly. A house-
hold with income above 400% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) cannot get subsidies.
People having income below 400% of FPL and receiving an ESHI oer are eligible for
premium subsidies in the individual market only if their employee's contribution (p) ex-
ceeds 9:5% of their total income. The subsidy structure ensures that individuals within
a certain income category do not spend more than a certain fraction of their income on
health insurance. More specically, spending on individual insurance premiums is limited
to the following percentage of total income15:
Maximum premium spending (% of income) Income categories (% of FPL)
2.0 <133
3.5 133-150
5.2 150-200
7.2 200-250
8.8 250-300
9.5 300-400
The income eligibility threshold for the general Medicaid program is increased to
133% of FPL. There are no changes in the Medically Needy program.
An uninsured person whose insurance premium in the individual market is less than
8% of his income has to pay a penalty. The penalty is determined as
Pen(yt; i
0
H) = maxf0:025yt; $695g if i0H = U
3.2 Insurance sector after the reform
The reform imposes a heavy regulation on the individual insurance market. Insurance
companies can no longer condition premiums on the current medical cost of individuals.
15The subsidy function specied in the Bill is slightly more complicated: for each income category it
species the range of maximum premium spending as a fraction of income. We approximate this range
by selecting the midpoint of a corresponding interval. For example, the range for the income category
133-150% of FPL is 3-4% and we approximate it by the midpoint 3.5%.
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The insurance premium of an individual of age bt will be determined by
pI
 bt = (1 + r) 1
R
t=bt 1fi0H(s)=IgEM (xt; t)   (s)

R
t=bt 1fi0H(s)=Ig  (s)
+ :
3.3 Government constraint
We maintain the assumption that the government runs a balanced budget. This
implies Z
[Tax (s) +  cct (s)]   (s) G+
Z
t<R
Pen(yt; i
0
H)  (s) =Z
tR
[sse + qmed (xt)xt   pmed]   (s) +
Z
T SIt   (s) +
Z
t<R
1fi0H=Mgq (xt; 1)xt  (s)
+
Z
t<R
Sub(ytott ; i
0
H)  (s)
The left-hand side now has an additional source of revenue - penalties from those unwilling
to purchase insurance. The right-hand side has an additional expenditure - subsidies.
To balance the government budget we adjust T (yt) to make it more progressive (details
are provided in the next section). This is done to reect the fact that the current
administration plans to nance the reform by increasing the tax burden on people with
the highest income.16
4 Data and calibration
4.1 Data
We calibrated the model using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) dataset.
The MEPS collects detailed records on demographics, income, medical costs and insur-
ance for a nationally representative sample of households. It consists of two-year over-
lapping panels and covers the period of 1996-2008. We use nine waves of the MEPS -
from 1999 to 2008.
The MEPS links people into one household based on eligibility for coverage under a
typical family insurance plan. This Health Insurance Eligibility Unit (HIEU) dened in
16More specically, the Bill increases hospital insurance payroll tax on people with income above
$200,000 by 0.9% and imposes a 3.8% tax on unearned income for higher-income tax-payers (Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2011). Our calibration strategy assumes a standard log-normal income process
commonly used in macro-literature, which cannot generate the empirical fraction of top-earners. Because
of this we increase the progressivity of the general tax code to capture the main idea of nancing the
reform by taxing the rich more.
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the MEPS dataset corresponds to our denition of a household. All statistics we use were
computed for the head of the HIEU. We dene the head as the male with the highest
income in the HIEU. If the HIEU does not have a male member we assign a female with
the highest income as its head. We use longitudinal weights provided in the MEPS to
compute all the statistics. Since each wave is a representation of population in each year,
the weight of each individual was divided by nine in the pooled sample.
In our sample we include all household heads who are at least 24 years old and
have non-negative labor income (to be dened later). The sample size for each wave is
presented in Table 1. We use 2002 as the base year. All level variables were normalized
to the base year using Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Panel 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 Total
Obs. 5,290 4,165 8,648 6,471 6,628 6,569 6,380 6,876 5,165 56,192
Table 1: Number of observations in nine waves of MEPS (1999-2008)
4.2 Demographics, preferences and technology
In the model, agents are born at age 25 and can live to a maximum age of 99. The
model period is one year so the maximum lifespan N is 75. Agents retire at the age of
65, so R is 41.
To adjust conditional survival probabilities t for the dierence in medical expenses
we follow Attanasio et al. (2011). In particular, we use Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS) and MEPS to estimate the dierence in survival probabilities for people in dierent
medical expense categories and use it to adjust the male life tables from the Social
Security Administration (more details are available in Appendix B). The population
growth rate was set to 1.35% to match the fraction of people older than 65 in the data.
We set the consumption share in the utility function  to 0.6 using the estimates
of French (2005).17 The parameter  is set to 5 which corresponds to the risk-aversion
over consumption equal to 3.4 which is in the range commonly used in the life-cycle
literature.18 The discount factor  is calibrated to match the aggregate capital output
ratio of 3. We set labor supply of those who choose to work (l) to 0.4
Fixed leisure costs of work t;e are calibrated to match the employment proles in
each educational and health group.19 More specically, we assume that xed costs for
17Given that we have indivisible labor supply we cannot pin down this parameter using a moment in
the data.
18The relative risk aversion over consumption is given by  cucc=uc = 1  (1  ):
19We dene a person as employed if he works at least 520 hours per year, earns at least $2,678 per
15
people in good health 1(t; e) do not vary with age and use this parameter to match the
employment rate for the age group 55-59 for each educational group.20 For the additional
xed costs of people with bad health 2(t; e), we assume it is a linear function of age. For
each educational group we adjust the intercept and the slope of this function to match
two moments: the employment rate of people in the 25-29 and 55-59 age groups who
have bad health. The resulting xed costs are presented in Table 2.
High-school dropouts HS and College graduates
1 0.2800 0.2650
2 intercept 0.0200 0.0450
2 slope 0.0008 0.0025
Table 2: Parameters characterizing disutility from work
The Cobb-Douglas function parameter  is set at 0.33, which corresponds to the
capital income share in the US. The annual depreciation rate  is calibrated to achieve
an interest rate of 4% in the baseline economy. The total factor productivity A is set
such that the total output equals one in the baseline model.
4.3 Government
In calibrating the tax function T (y) we use a nonlinear function specied by Gouveia
and Strauss (1994):
T (y) = a0

y   (y a1 + a2) 1=a1

This functional form is commonly used in the quantitative macroeconomic literature
(for example, Conesa and Krueger, 2006; Jeske and Kitao, 2009). In this functional form
a0 controls the marginal tax rate faced by the highest income group, a1 determines the
curvature of marginal taxes and a2 is a scaling parameter. We set a0 and a1 to the original
estimates as in Gouveia and Strauss (1994), which are 0.258 and 0.768 correspondingly.
The parameter a2 is used to balance the government budget. When implementing the
reform we keep a2 xed at a level that balances the budget in the baseline economy. To
achieve a balanced budget in the reformed economy, we adjust the parameter a0.
We set proportional income tax  y to 6.62% to match the fact that around 65% of
tax revenues come from income taxes that are approximated in our calibration by the
progressive function T (y). The minimum consumption oor c was set to $2,700 following
year in base year dollars (this corresponds to working at least 10 hours per week and earning a minimum
wage of $5.15 per hour), and does not report being retired or receiving Social Security benets.
20Our model tends to overestimate the employment rate of healthy young people with high education,
possibly due to the borrowing constraints and the lack of intra-family transfers. Matching employment
at a young age will result in counter-intuitive decreasing leisure costs over the life-cycle.
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the estimates of De Nardi et al. (2010). The Social Security replacement rates were set
to 40% and 30% of the average labor income for people with low and high education
correspondingly, reecting the progressivity of the system.
Medicaid eligibility rules were taken from the data. The income eligibility threshold
for general Medicaid (ycat) is set to 64% of FPL which is the median value for this thresh-
old among all states in 2009. The income eligibility threshold for the Medically Needy
program (yneed) and asset test for this program (kpub) are set to 53% of FPL and $2,000
correspondingly. These numbers are equal to the median values for the corresponding
eligibility criteria in 2009 in the states that have Medically Needy program.21
The Medicare, Social Security and consumption tax rates were set to 2.9%, 12.4%
and 5.67% correspondingly. The maximum taxable income for Social Security is set to
$84,900. The fraction of exogenous government expenses in GDP is 18%.
4.4 Insurance sector
The share of health insurance premium paid by the rm ( ) was chosen to match
the aggregate ESHI take-up rate.22 The resulting number (76.3%) is consistent with
the one observed in the U.S. economy, which is in the range of 75-85% (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2009).
We set the proportional loads for group and individual insurance policies () to 1.11
(Kahn et al., 2005). The xed costs of buying an individual policy  is set to $23 to
match the aggregate fraction of people with individual insurance.
4.5 Labor income
We divide households into two educational groups: high-school dropouts and people
with at least a high-school degree. The fraction of each group in the population is 15%
and 85% correspondingly. Individuals with dierent education and health have dierent
productivity, specied as follows:
ze;xt = 
e;x
t exp(vt) exp(t) (19)
where e;xt is the deterministic function of age, education and medical expenses category,
and
vt = vt 1 + "t; "t  N(0; 2") (20)
t  N(0; 2)
21In our model FPL does not change after the reform so the Medical eligibility thresholds are not
aected by the change in the aggregate variables.
22In this paper we use the term \take-up rate"only in relation to the employer-based market, and it
denes the fraction of people among those with an ESHI oer who choose to buy group insurance.
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For the persistent shock vt we set  to 0.98 and 
2
" to 0.018 following the incomplete
market literature (Storesletten et al (2004); Hubbard et al (1994); Erosa et al (2011);
French (2005)). We set the variance of the transitory shock (2) to 0.1 which is in the
range estimated by Erosa et al (2011). In our computation we discretize the stochastic
shocks vt and t using the method in Floden (2008).
23 To construct the distribution of
newborn individuals, we draw v1 in equation (20) from N(0; 0:124) distribution following
Heathcote et al. (2010).
To identify the deterministic part of productivity e;xt we need to take into account
that in the data we only observe labor income of workers and we do not know the potential
income of non-workers. In the data people in dierent medical expenses categories have
similar average labor income but dier substantially in their employment proles. If
people with low productivity tend to drop out from the employment pool there will be a
selection bias when estimating labor income from the data.
To address this problem we use the method developed by French (2005). We start
by estimating the labor income proles of workers based on the MEPS dataset.24 Then
we guess e;xt in equation (19) and feed these productivity proles into our model. After
solving and simulating the model we compute the average labor income prole of workers
in our model and compare it with the income proles from the data. If our simulated labor
income is too high, we update the deterministic part of productivity e;xt downwards, and
if it is too low - upwards. We reiterate until the labor income prole generated by our
model is the same as in the data.25;26 The advantage of this approach is that we can
reconstruct the productivity ze;xt of individuals whom we do not observe working in the
data.
Figure (1) plots the labor income proles of workers observed in the data and simu-
lated by the model, and compares them with the average potential labor income computed
for everyone in the model. The later prole takes into account the unobserved productiv-
ity of those people who do not work. The average labor income of workers is higher than
the average labor income that includes potential income of non-workers because people
with low productivity tend to drop out from the employment pool. This also suggests
23We use 9 grid points for vt and 2 grid points for t. The grid of vt is expanding to capture the
increasing cross-sectional variance. Our discretized process for vt generates the autocorrelation of 0.98
and 0.016 for its innovation variance.
24Household labor income is dened as the sum of wages (variable WAGEP) and 75% of the income
from business (variable BUSNP). This denition is the same as the one used in the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics Dataset (PSID), which has been commonly used for income calibration in the macroeconomic
literature.
25More specically, for a given educational and age group we specify e;xt as a cubic function of age,
thus we need to nd four coecients. To recover these four coecients we use the following four moments:
average labor income for workers at age 25, 40, 50, and 60 for each educational group.
26Based on our experiments, for a given set of model parameters there seems to be a unique set of
coecients dening e;xt that can match the labor income prole in the data. See French (2005) for a
more detailed discussion of identication.
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Figure 1: Average labor income of workers (data and model) and of everyone (model). The later prole
takes into account the unobserved productivity of those people who do not work.
that if we do not use the correction described above we would overestimate the labor
income for non-participating individuals and this bias is especially strong in the case of
unhealthy workers and workers at pre-retirement age, i.e. groups with lower employment
rate. Our estimates also show that unhealthy people are inherently less productive. The
drop in productivity due to bad health depends on age but it can be as high as 22% for
high-school dropouts and as high as 15% for people with at least a high-school degree.27
27Capatina (2011) also nds that the negative impact of bad health on productivity is more pronounced
for people with low education.
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4.6 Oer rate
We assume that probability of getting an oer of ESHI coverage is a logistic function28:
Probt =
exp(ut)
1 + exp(ut)
;
where the variable ut is an odds ratio that takes the following form:
ut = 
e
0 + 
e
1 log(inct ) + 
e
2 [log(inct )]
2 + e3 [log(inct )]
3 + e41fgt 1=1g +
eDt (21)
Here e0; 
e
1; 
e
2; 
e
3; 
e
4 and 
e are education-specic coecients, inct is individual labor
income (normalized by the average labor income), andDt is a set of year dummy variables.
To construct the initial oer rate (g1 in equation (21)) we run a separate logistic regression
for people aged 24-26 where we do not include oer in the previous period but include
dummies for medical expenses categories.
4.7 Insurance status
In the MEPS the question about the source of insurance coverage is asked retro-
spectively for each month of the year. We dene a person as having employer-based
insurance if he reports having ESHI for at least eight months during the year (variables
PEGJA-PEGDE). The same criterion is used when dening public insurance (variables
PUBJA-PUBDE) and individual insurance status (variables PRIJA-PRIDE). For those
few individuals who switch sources of coverage during a year, we use the following deni-
tion of insurance status. If a person has both ESHI and individual insurance in one year,
and each coverage lasted for less than eight months, but the total duration of coverage
lasted for more than eight months, we classify this person as individually insured. Like-
wise, when a person has a combination of individual and public coverage that altogether
lasts for more than eight months, we dene that individual as having public insurance.29
4.8 Medical expenditures
Medical costs in our model correspond to the total paid medical expenditures in
the MEPS dataset (variable TOTEXP). These include not only out-of-pocket medical
expenses but also the costs covered by insurers. In our calibration medical expense shock
is approximated by a 5-state discrete Markov process. For each age, we divide medical
28In our estimation we assume that an individual has an oer if any member of his HIEU reports having
an oer in at least two out of three interview rounds during a year (variables OFFER31x, OFFER42x,
OFFER53x). In addition, we exclude household heads whose income was below $1,000 when estimating
the logistic regression.
29The results do not signicantly change if we change the cuto point to 6 or 12 months.
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expenditures into 5 bins, corresponding to 30th, 60th, 90th and 99th percentiles (more
details on this are available in Appendix C). We set xt that separates people into dierent
medical expenses categories to the 90th percentile of medical expenses distribution of the
corresponding age. In other words, people whose medical expenses are in the lowest three
bins are classied as healthy, while people whose medical expenses are in the highest two
bins are classied as unhealthy. To construct the transition matrix we measure the
fraction of people who move from one bin to another between two consecutive years
separately for people of working age (25-64) and for retirees (older than 65).
We use MEPS to estimate the fraction of medical expenses covered by insurance
policies q (xt; it) (we explain more in Appendix C). We nd that Medicaid provides
better coverage than private insurance for low medical expenses but for higher expenses
private insurance is more generous. For retired households we set qmed (xt) to 0.5 to
match the fraction of medical expenses of the retirees nanced by the government (3.0%
of GDP).
The model parametrization is summarized in Table 9 in Appendix A.
5 Baseline model performance
Figure (2) compares the employment proles observed in the data with the ones
generated by the model. The model closely tracks the employment proles for each
educational and health group though it slightly overestimates employment rate of the
youngest group.
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Figure 2: Employment proles for people with low education (left panel) and high education (right
panel): data vs. model
Table 3 compares the aggregate health insurance statistics generated by the model
with the ones observed in the data. The model was calibrated to match the data on
21
ESHI take-up rates and individual insurance rates. However, the model also produces
numbers on the fractions of uninsured and publicly insured close to the data. The last
four columns of Table 3 show insurance statistics by educational groups. Our model does
not target any of these statistics, but it still fares well along these dimensions.
All Low education High education
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Insured by ESHI (%) 63.0 64.4 33.3 29.1 68.5 70.6
Individually insured (%) 7.6 7.3 5.5 3.8 8.0 8.0
Uninsured (%) 20.2 19.7 39.5 43.2 16.6 15.6
Publicly insured (%) 9.2 8.6 21.7 23.8 6.9 5.9
ESHI take-up rate (%) 94.3 94.2 85.9 81.6 93.9 95.3
Oer rate (%) 67.6 68.3 38.8 35.7 72.9 74.1
Group premium/avg.income (%) 7.0 6.7 - - - -
Table 3: Insurance statistics: data vs. model
The top panel of Figure (3) plots the percentages of the uninsured and those publicly
insured in the model and in the data. For both educational groups, the model can match
the corresponding empirical proles. There is an overprediction in the number of publicly
insured for people of preretirement age due to our simplied Medicaid eligibility criteria.
The bottom panel of Figure (3) compares the life-cycle proles of the fraction of people
with private insurance for dierent educational groups in the model and in the data. The
model reproduces the general life-cycle pattern and dierences in educational group in
insurance rates. However, for low educated people it underestimates the fraction of people
with ESHI among the older group which happens because we overestimate the fraction
of the publicly insured for this age category. The model also tends to underpredict the
fraction of people with individual insurance among young low-educated people because
we abstract from dierent Medicaid rules by state and assume only one choice of plan in
the individual insurance market.
It is well-known that a standard incomplete-market model cannot generate wealth
concentration as in the data. However, we are able to reproduce a reasonable amount
of wealth inequality. People in the top 20th, 40th and 60th percentiles in our model
hold 55.2%, 81.5% and 95.1% of the aggregate wealth while in the data these numbers
are 84.4%, 95.7% and 99.6% correspondingly (Wol, 2010). The numbers produced by
our model are similar to the numbers produced by other quantitative models featuring
incomplete labor markets and medical expenses shocks (see, for example, Imrohoroglu
and Kitao, 2012). Our model also produces a reasonable number of poor people: the
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Figure 3: Percent of uninsured and publicly insured (top panel) and privately insured (bottom panel)
data vs. model
fraction of people (including retirees) with assets less than $1,000 is 10.9%. In the Survey
of Consumer Finance (SCF) this number is 11.1% in 2004 (Kennickell, 2006).
6 Eects of the reform
In this section we describe the eects of the reform on employment, insurance and
government nances by comparing the two steady-states: before and after the reform
(the transition dynamics is described in Appendix E). Then we provide the analysis of
the welfare eects which takes into account the transition period to the new steady-state.
6.1 Eect on the employment
The reform does not have a signicant impact on the aggregate employment rate which
slightly decreases from 89.7% to 89.1%. Figure (4) compares the employment proles
before and after the reform. There is a noticeable change in employment of people with
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bad health. Unhealthy people with low education increase their labor supply while for
unhealthy people with high education labor supply goes down. This opposite direction
of adjustment in labor supply is due to the eect of Medicaid and ESHI. In general, for
unhealthy group health insurance is very valuable but very expensive if obtained through
the individual market. Before the reform, unhealthy people with low education have to
rely on Medicaid while the highly educated group has to rely on ESHI. In order to satisfy
the income eligibility requirements for Medicaid, unhealthy low educated people may
need to stop working. In contrast, unhealthy people with high education have to work in
order to be eligible for ESHI. After the reform, given the relaxed eligibility requirements
for Medicaid and the availability of subsidies, these distorting eects are substantially
diminished.30
The response in employment mainly comes from people with low productivity. For
unhealthy people with low education, the average productivity prole among workers de-
creases after the reform, implying that people with lower than average productivity join
the employment pool. For unhealthy people with high education, the average productiv-
ity prole goes up, implying that people who leave the employment pool have lower than
average productivity.
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Figure 4: Employment proles before and after the reform for people with low education (left panel)
and high education (right panel). The comparison is done for the steady-states.
6.2 Eect on insurance
Table 4 compares the aggregate insurance statistics between the two steady-states -
the baseline and the reformed economies.
30Pohl (2011) nds a similar pattern when using a structural model to simulate the eects of the
current reform on the labor supply of single mothers. In particular, he nds that individuals with
medical conditions are more likely to increase labor supply in response to the Medicaid expansion and
the introduction of subsidies, or to quit job that oers ESHI.
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Variable Baseline Reform
Insured by ESHI (%) 64.4 62.5
Individually insured (%) 7.3 18.5
Uninsured (%) 19.7 8.9
Publicly insured (%) 8.6 10.1
Group premium/avg.income (%) 6.7 6.0
Employment 89.7 89.1
Aggregate capital 3.00 2.92
Table 4: Insurance statistics before and after the reform (steady-state comparisons)
The fraction of people with ESHI stays almost the same. This is not surprising given
our assumption that neither ESHI oer rates nor employer contribution rates change in
response to the reform. The percentage of people with individual insurance increases
more than twofold: from 7.3% to 18.5%. At the same time, there is a big drop in the
uninsurance rate which goes down from 19.7% to 8.9%. The number of publicly insured
increases from 8.6% to 10.1% due to the expansion of Medicaid.31;32
The top panel of Figure (5) compares the percentages of people without health insur-
ance before and after the reform. In all educational and age groups there is a noticeable
decline in the fraction of the uninsured. The largest reduction in the number of uninsured
is observed among high-school dropouts especially at young ages.
The bottom panel of Figure (5) displays the fraction of people with public insurance.
For both educational groups the fraction of people insured by Medicaid increases at
young age but decreases at preretirement age. In our calibration Medicaid provides a
better coverage for low medical expenses but for high medical expenses private insurance
is more generous. Since medical expenses increase steeply with age, subsidized private
insurance becomes more attractive than Medicaid as people get older. As shown in the
bottom panel of Figure (6), the fraction of people with individual insurance increases
sharply with age.
The top panel of Figure (6) compares the fraction of people with ESHI before and
31The percentage of people newly eligible for Medicaid (in the income category 64-133% of FPL) is
around 7.7% in the pre-reform economy. However, the expansion of Medicaid does not increase the
percentage of publicly insured much because many of newly eligible people prefer to buy subsidized
individual insurance. This is because the subsidy scheme is very generous for people in this income
category and individual insurance provides better coverage in case of high medical shocks.
32Table 4 shows that even though the reform substantially decreases the number of uninsured, the
insurance coverage is far from universal: around 9% of people will stay uninsured. People who stay
uninsured after the reform have low expected medical expenses and they are not eligible for subsidies.
These people prefer to pay penalties because community-rated premiums are substantially higher than
premiums they face in the unregulated market.
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Figure 5: Percent of uninsured and publicly insured before and after the reform for people with low
education (left panel) and high education (right panel). The comparison is done for the steady-states.
after the reform. For people older than 40 there is a decrease in ESHI coverage for both
educational groups. This is due to the crowd-out by Medicaid and subsidized individual
insurance.33 Older people have higher disutility from work when they are unhealthy,
and after the reform they do not need to work in order to access ESHI since they have
alternative insurance options.34
6.3 Eect on government nances
Table 5 shows the changes in government nances after the reform. The govern-
ment spending on health insurance for the working-age group (including subsidies net
33Cutler and Gruber (1996) also found that Medicaid expansion over the 1987-1992 period caused the
crowd-out of ESHI.
34The decrease in the group premium reported in Table 4 can be explained by this tendency of older
unhealthy people to leave the employment pool, thus resulting in better risk composition. Clemens
(2012) describes similar patterns when studying the eect of the Medicaid expansion in the end of 1990s
on the community-rated markets in some states. In particular, he nds that sick people switch to newly
available public coverage thus reducing community-rated premiums.
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Figure 6: Percent of people with ESHI and individual insurance before and after the reform for people
with low education (left panel) and high education (right panel). The comparison is done for the steady-
states.
Change in Value
Spending on health insurance for working-age (%) +124.1
Spending to guarantee minimum consumption for working-age (%) -45.6
Average tax for average wage (percentage point) 1.20
Table 5: Changes in the government nances after the reform
of penalties and Medicaid expansion) increases by 124%. On the other hand, there is a
signicant decline in spending on transfers to guarantee the minimum consumption oor.
For working-age households these transfers drop by almost 46%. The average tax rate
for a person with average income increases by 1.20 percentage points in the reformed
economy.35;36
35The change in marginal taxes for dierent income groups is discussed in Appendix H.
36Even though the reform increases income redistribution in the economy it does not have a noticeable
impact on wealth inequality. The Gini coecient after the reform changes very slightly going down from
0.556 to 0.552.
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6.4 Welfare analysis
Consumption equivalent variation (CEV) for the reformed economy is presented in
Table 6.37 The reform brings a signicant welfare improvement: the average welfare gains
of people who live through the transition period are equal to 0.64%.38 Around 66% of
people gain from the reform. People who gain the most are low educated people: their
average CEV exceeds 1%.39 People with high education also gain from the reform though
their gains are substantially lower. High welfare gains for low educated people are not
surprising since they are the main beneciaries of the expanded Medicaid and subsidies
for health insurance purchase. The fact that even highly educated people tend to gain
despite the higher tax burden is due to the lower ESHI premium (fth row of Table 4) and
the improved risk-sharing in the economy40. Before the reform highly-educated people
rely on ESHI as the main source of insurance coverage and this has several disadvantages.
First, people face the risk of losing ESHI every period and this event is likely to coincide
with negative income shock. If this happens, the availability of public or subsidized health
insurance becomes valuable, especially if a person is unhealthy. Second, an individual
can buy ESHI only if he works, which may be a constraint for older people in bad health
whose disutility from work is high but insurance is very valuable. The availability of
subsidized coverage not conditioned on working substantially increases the welfare of
this group.
If we decompose the welfare eects by age, we see that retirees lose from the reform
(Table 6) with an average loss equal to - 0.65%. This happens because the reform does not
improve insurance possibilities for retirees who are already covered by public insurance.
However, they share the burden of reform nancing through higher taxes.
37Let V B denote the value function in the baseline economy and V R - the value function in the
reformed economy. The CEV for an individual with state variables s can be dened as:
CEV (s) = 100 
241  V Bt;e (s)
V Rt;e (s)
! 1
(1 )
35
The resulting number represents the percentage of the annual consumption an individual in the reformed
economy is willing to give up in order to be indierent between the baseline and reformed economies. The
positive number implies welfare gains. The CEV reported in Tables 6 and 7, and Figure 7 averages out
CEV (s) for all people who are alive at the beginning of the transition period and using the distribution
of people over states as in the steady-state in the baseline economy.
38We show in Appendix G that if employers respond to the reform by substantially decreasing their
contributions the welfare gains will be smaller (0.47%). This is mostly driven by decrease in the welfare
of people with high education who suer from the partial unraveling of the employer-based market.
39This result is dierent from Janicki (2011) who nds that the main beneciaries of the reform are
high-income people. His nding is mostly driven by the fact that the consumption minimum oor in his
model is tied to the aggregate output. The aggregate output decreases after the reform, consequently
fewer people can rely on means-tested transfers. This disproportionately hurts low-income households,
outweighing any benets they may have from the reform. In contrast, Jung and Trun (2011) nd that
poor people gain more from the reform.
40After the reform the interest rate goes up slightly, which also mostly benets highly educated people.
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CEV(%)
Low High
All education education
All ages 0.64 1.43 0.51
Age 25-64 0.95 1.85 0.79
Age 65-99 -0.65 -0.37 -0.69
% who gains 66.2 76.7 64.4
Table 6: Welfare eects of the reform (including the transition period)
For people of working age the average CEV is equal to 0.95%. Figure (7) reports the
average CEV during the transition for each education, productivity and health group.
This gure shows that people who gain most are those with high education/low productiv-
ity and low education/high productivity.41 People with low education/low productivity
do not gain much because they get access to public insurance even before the reform.
Since highly productive people with high education are not usually eligible for benets
from the reform, their gains are small or negative. Unhealthy people tend to gain sub-
stantially more than the healthy. There is a noticeable drop in welfare for people over
50-55 because this group has less time to enjoy the benets of the reform.
6.5 Decomposing the eect of the reform
To decompose the welfare eects of the reform we use several experiments. First, we
remove the subsidies and Medicaid expansion from the original reform but keep provi-
sions for the community rated individual market and penalties for individuals without
insurance. We call this case 'only community rating'. Second, we keep all the redis-
tributive measures embedded in the original reform (subsidies and Medicaid expansion)
but we allow for the unregulated individual insurance market (no community rating)
and remove penalties. We call this version of the reform 'only redistribution'. Table 7
compares the results of these modied reforms with the original one, and Table 8 reports
insurance statistics for each counterfactual reform.
The second row of Table 7 shows the results of implementing the reform with only
community rating. In this case, the welfare gains from the reform become negative,
decreasing from 0.64 to -0.11%.
After the implementation of the reform with only community rating the individual
market suers from an adverse selection spiral. As can be seen from the left panel of
41The welfare gains of the latter group can be as high as 3.5%. These high gains are mostly driven
by the previously uninsured members of this group who did not have access to ESHI and who were not
eligible for Medicaid before the reform.
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Figure 7: Consumption equivalent variation by health and productivity for people with low education
(top panel) and high education (bottom panel). We dene a person as having high productivity if his
persistent shock falls in the highest two grid points, and as having low productivity if this shock is in
the lowest three grid points. Welfare calculations include the transition period.
Figure (8), the premium in the individual market is at the level of risk-adjusted premiums
for people in the highest grid of medical expenses. In other words, only people with high
expected medical expenses participate in the individual market. The second row of Table
8 claries this point by showing that participation in the individual market decreases
to 0.7%. This suggests that penalties are not enough to enforce participation in the
community rated individual market. The fact that in the original reform many people
participate in the individual market is primarily due to the eect of subsidies but not
of penalties.42 This suggests that subsidies are enough to solve the problem of adverse
42This result is dierent from Jung and Tran (2011) who nd that penalties are eective to make
people buy health insurance. This discrepancy can be explained by two observations from their model.
First, uninsured people in their model do not have a problem with aordability of premiums: when the
authors consider a counterfactual reform without subsidies, 97% of people can aord health insurance.
Second, the individual market in their model does not suer from the adverse selection problem even if
penalties are removed: the individual insurance premium stays almost the same as in the original reform
even though the number of insured decreases from 98% to 72%.
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CEV(%)
Low High
All education education
1. Reform 0.64 1.43 0.51
2. Only CR -0.11 -0.07 -0.12
3. Only CR+high penalties 0.06 -0.02 0.07
4. Only redistribution 0.50 1.36 0.35
5. Only Medicaid expansion -0.02 0.32 -0.08
6. Only subsidies 0.43 1.19 0.29
Table 7: Welfare eect of dierent versions of the reform (including the transition period)
ESHI Individual Uninsured Public
insurance insurance
Baseline 64.4 7.3 19.7 8.6
1. Reform 62.5 18.5 8.9 10.1
2. Only CR 65.3 0.7 25.4 8.6
3. Only CR+high penalties 67.1 11.4 13.1 8.3
4. Only redistribution 61.9 18.1 9.9 10.1
5. Only Medicaid expansion 62.0 5.2 14.6 18.2
6. Only subsidies 64.3 21.8 11.5 2.4
Table 8: Insurance statistics for dierent versions of the reform (steady-state comparisons)
selection in the community-rated individual market after the reform.43
To understand whether the small welfare eect of the reform with only community
rating is a result of the adverse selection spiral, we implemented the same reform but
with penalties that are three times higher than in the original reform. In this case we do
not observe the adverse selection spiral in the individual market for people younger than
55.44 As shown on the right panel of Figure (8), the price of the individual insurance is
much lower and closer to the premium in the original reform. Also, the participation in
the individual market increases to 11.4% (third row of Table 8). The third row of Table
7 shows that comparing to the case with lower penalties the welfare slightly increases
(from -0.11 to 0.06%). However it is still much lower than in the original reform.
The fourth row of Table 7 shows the results for the reform with only redistribution.
This version of the reform brings high welfare gains: the consumption equivalent variation
43We conrm this by considering a counterfactual reform when we remove penalties but keep all other
provisions as in the original reform. In this case the premium in the individual market does not change
much comparing to the original reform: it slightly increases at young ages but stay almost the same at
older ages.
44Even increasing penalties ve times cannot eliminate adverse selection spiral for people at pre-
retirement ages. This happens because medical expenses for unhealthy members of this group are very
high and the community rated premium for many people exceeds their income.
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Figure 8: Individual market premiums before the reform, after the original reform, and after the reform
with only community rating (left panel) or community rating with high penalties (right panel). The set
of ve dashed lines shows the risk-adjusted premiums before the reform for each medical expense grid.
The solid line shows the community-rated premium after the reform. The line with triangle marks (circle
marks for the right panel) shows the community-rated premium for the reform with only community
rating (only community rating with high penalties for the right panel). All comparisons are done for the
steady-states.
is equal to 0.50%.
The important result is that the reform with only redistribution brings substantially
higher welfare gains than the reform with only community rating. This suggests that
income-based transfers improve the welfare of people more than the new rules in the
individual market. Many individual market participants have low income and insurance
premiums constitute a signicant fraction of their income. Without subsidies they often
prefer to stay uninsured. To illustrate this point further, Figure (9) compares the fraction
of individual market premiums in the average income for low educated people before the
reform and after the two versions of reform: with only community rating (with high
penalties) and with only income redistribution. If the reform is implemented with only
community rating with high penalties, the share of premiums in income increases for
people with low medical expenses and decreases for people with high medical expenses.
However, the share of community rated premium in income is high: it increases fast
and exceeds 20% after age 50. On the other hand, when reform is implemented without
community rating but with subsidies, the share of subsidized individual market premiums
in income is signicantly lower even for people with high medical expenses.
To understand how dierent redistributive measures embedded in the reform con-
tribute to its welfare outcome we consider two versions of the reform with only redistri-
bution: i) the reform that only expands Medicaid, and ii) the reform that only introduces
subsidies. The welfare eects of these reforms are presented in fth and sixth rows of
Table 7. In welfare terms, subsidies are the most important element of the reform: just
32
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Age
Sh
ar
e 
of
 in
di
vid
ua
l p
re
m
iu
m
s 
in
 in
co
m
e,
 %
Low education, first medical costs grid
 
 
Before the reform
Only community rating
Only redistribution
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Age
Sh
ar
e 
of
 in
di
vid
ua
l p
re
m
iu
m
s 
in
 in
co
m
e,
 %
Low education, fourth medical costs grid
 
 
Before the reform
Only community rating
Only redistribution
Figure 9: Fraction of individual insurance premiums in income for people with low (left panel) and
high (right panel) medical costs for the original reform and two counterfactual reforms. All comparisons
are done for the steady-states.
introducing subsidies brings CEV equal to 0.43%, while Medicaid expansion alone re-
sults in small welfare losses (-0.02%). This is because the subsidy scheme has transfers
well targeted at people with low income and/or high medical expenses. This directly
addresses the aordability problem and thus has a large impact on welfare. Medicaid
expansion, on the other hand, aect only a small group of people with very low income
whose gains are not big enough to oset welfare losses from the increased taxes.45
7 Conclusion
The health reform bill recently signed by the President includes a wide range of
measures which aim to increase the health insurance coverage in the U.S. The new law
signicantly changes the rules under which the individual insurance market operates.
At the same time, it includes a set of redistributive measures that decrease the price of
insurance for low-income people. This paper measures the welfare eects of the reform
and decomposes them into two parts - one that is due to the new regulation of the
individual market, and other due to the increased income redistribution in the economy.
We construct a general equilibrium heterogeneous model with a rich representation of
the current U.S. health insurance system. We calibrate the model using Medical Expenses
Panel Survey to match the key insurance statistics of the U.S. economy.
We nd that the reform brings signicant welfare gains, however these gains are
mostly achieved by the redistributive part of the reform - Medicaid expansion and pre-
45More specically, the welfare gains of people of a working age are not enough to oset the welfare
losses of the retirees in this version of the reform. If comparisons are done only for the steady-states,
the expansion of Medicaid results in ex-ante welfare gains equal to 0.18%.
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mium subsidies. If the reform only changes the regulation of the individual market and
introduces penalties for the uninsured, the welfare gains almost disappear. Most of the
currently uninsured have low-income and they gain a lot from having subsidized health
insurance. Reorganizing the individual insurance market alone has a limited eect on
these people because non-subsidized insurance premiums, whether community rated or
not, constitute such a signicant portion of their income that they often prefer to stay
uninsured if not subsidized.
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A Summary of the parametrization of the baseline
model
Parameters set outside the model
Parameter name Notation Value Source
Risk aversion  5 -
Consumption share { 0.6 French (2005)
Cobb-Douglas parameter  0.33 Capital share in output
Labor supply l 0.4 -
Cuto medical expenses xt 90th percentile -
Consumption oor c $2,700 De Nardi et al., 2010
Tax function parameters: a0 0.258 Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
a1 0.768 Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
Social Security replacement rates:
Below High-School ss1 40% -
High-School & College ss2 30% -
Insurance loads  1.11 Kahn et all (2005)
Medicaid income threshold:
Medicaid ycat 64% Data
Medically Needy yneed 53% Data
Asset test for Medically Needy kpub $2,000 Data
Medicare premium pmed $1,055 Total premiums =2.11% of Y
Persistent shock
Persistence parameter  0.98 Heathcote et al (2010)
Variance of innovations 2" 0.018 Heathcote et al (2010)
Variance of transitory shock 2 0.10 Erosa et al (2011)
Parameters used to match some targets
Parameter name Notation Value Source/Target
Discount factor  0.992
K
Y
= 3
Depreciation rate  0.07 r = 0:04
Population growth  1.35% % of people older than 65
Tax function parameter a2 0.652 Balanced government budget
Proportional tax  y 6.62% Composition of tax revenue
Fixed costs for insurance  $22.7 % of individually insured
Employer contribution  76.3% ESHI take-up rate
Fixed costs of work Employment proles
Healthy:
low education 1(1) 0.2800
high education 1(2) 0.2650
Unhealthy, low educ: 2(t; 1)
intercept - 0.0200
slope - 0.0008
Unhealthy, high educ: 2(t; 2)
intercept - 0.0450
slope - 0.0025
Table 9: Parameters of the model
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B Adjustment of survival probabilities
To adjust the survival probabilities for dierence in health we follow Attanasio et
al (2011). We use the HRS dataset to estimate the survival probability for males as a
function of age, health and gender using a probit model. In this regression we use a binary
variable for health (good and bad) dened from self-reported health in the following way:
people reporting their health as excellent, very good or good are classied as 'healthy',
and people reporting their health as fair or poor are classied as 'unhealthy'. However,
in our model we dene health based on the category of medical expenses. To adjust
for the dierent denitions we use MEPS to get the fraction of people with good and
bad self-reported health in each medical expense category at each age. Then using the
estimates from the probit model we compute the average survival probability for each
age and medical expenses category.
Next we compute the 'survival premium' - the dierence between survival probabilities
of males with high and low medical expenses for each age. From the Social Security
Administration life table we know the average survival probability of males. From MEPS
we can construct the fraction of people in each medical expense category for each age.
Using this information we can recover survival probabilities of people with high and
low medical expenditures for each age. Figure (10) illustrates the resulting survival
probabilities for people in dierent medical expense categories.
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Figure 10: Survival probabilities for people in dierent medical expense categories
C Medical expenses and insurance coverage
To calibrate medical expenses we separate our sample into 13 age groups (25-29,
30-34, ..., 85+). We assign the age of each group to the mid-point of a corresponding
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age interval. For example, 27 for 25-29, 32 for 30-34, etc. For each year and each age
group we divide medical expenditures into 5 bins, corresponding to 30th, 60th, 90th and
99th percentiles. To get a value of medical expenses in each bin we run a regression of
medical expenses on a set of age and year dummies. Since 9 waves of MEPS cover 10
years and there are 13 age groups, we have 130 observations for each such regression. The
coecients on age dummies in this regression correspond to the average medical expenses
for the corresponding age in a particular bin. Then we t our estimated coecients with
a cubic function of age.
The MEPS tends to underestimate the aggregate medical expenditures (Sing et al,
2002). To account for this we compare the average medical expenses between the MEPS
and the National Health Expenditure Account (NHEA) in 2002.46 The downward bias in
the medical expenses from the MEPS is much larger for the elderly (particulary after age
75) than for the young.47 Because of this, we multiply our estimated medical expenses
by 1.37 for people younger than 75 years old and by 1.93 for people older than 75 years
old. This adjustment allows us to match the share of total expenses in GDP (12.6%) and
the share of medical expenses of people younger than 65 in GDP (6.5%) as in NHEA.
The resulting proles are shown in the left panel of Figure (11).
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Figure 11: Medical expenses for each bin (left panel) and fraction of medical expenses covered by
private insurance and Medicaid (right panel)
To determine the fraction of medical expenses covered by private insurance and Med-
icaid (q (xt; it)), we use the following approach. For working age households we estimate
medical expenditures paid by private insurers (variable TOTPRV) or Medicaid (variable
TOTMCD) as a quadratic function of total paid medical expenditures and year dummy
46NHEA reports age decomposition of medical expenses only for 2002 and 2004.
47MEPS underepresents institutionalized population and the fraction of people in nursing homes in-
creases dramatically after age 75 (see Kopecky and Koreshkova, 2011).
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variables.48 The right panel of Figure (11) illustrates the fraction of medical expenses
covered by private insurance and Medicaid.
D Discussion of the assumption of exogenous medi-
cal expenses
In our model we treat medical expenses as exogenous shocks, i.e. we abstract from the
fact that people have some degree of control over their medical expenses. Our modeling
choice arises because medical expenses to a signicant extent represent exogenous shocks,
and our goal is to evaluate how well the reform improves the insurance possibilities in the
economy. We realize that by treating medical expenses as an exogenous process we can
miss some eects of the reform arising from possible adjustments in medical expenses.
Here we provide a brief discussion of the potential direction and size of these eects.
In general, most of the models of endogenous medical expenses are based on Gross-
man's framework (Grossman, 1972). The key feature of this framework is that medical
expenses can increase the stock of health which increases utility. Another important
aspect of Grossman's framework is the possibility to intertemporally allocate medical
spending. First, people with bad health can delay treatment. Second, people can invest
in preventive care in order to decrease the probability to face high medical shocks in the
future.
Under this framework we can expect the following eects. First, currently uninsured
people can increase their medical spending because they have previously delayed their
medical treatment, and medical spending increase their utility.49 This can increase in-
surance premiums, implying higher government spending on subsidies and higher taxes.
This will lead to lower welfare gains from the reform. On the other hand, since medical
spending can increase utility it will lead to higher welfare gains from the reform.
Second, we can expect that currently uninsured people will increase their preventive
medical spending.50 This can improve the distribution of medical shocks in the future
and decrease their exposure to medical risk.51 In the long run this can lead to a decrease
in medical expenses partially osetting the eect of moral hazard described earlier and
positively aecting welfare gains of the reform.
48The R2 from these regressions are 0.86 for private insurance and 0.70 for Medicaid.
49We expect this eect to be small based on the results of Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) who did not
nd an increase in costs at the hospital level after the health reform in Massachusetts which has a design
very similar to the national reform.
50Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) nd that after the health reform in Massachusetts hospitalizations for
preventable conditions were reduced. Miller (2011) nds that the reform results in a decline in emergency
room usage in Massachusetts mostly accounted for by a reduction in preventable emergencies.
51For a quantitative examination of such mechanism see Ozkan (2011).
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In terms of the relative importance of community rating and income redistribution,
we do not expect the eects described above to change the dominant role of income
redistribution. In Grossman's framework people can adjust their medical expenses in
response to a change in insurance status. However, our results show that community
rating is not an eective policy to increase the number of insured because it does not
solve the problem of aordability. Thus, even if medical expenses are endogenous, we
expect that income redistribution will still play a dominant role in welfare eects of the
reform.52
E Transition to the reformed economy
This section describes how the economy makes a transition from the initial steady-
state to the new steady-state. The economy is assumed to be in the steady-state in
period 0 and in period 1 the reform is announced and implemented. Figure (12) shows
how aggregate capital, tax function parameter a0, employment and uninsurance rates for
each educational group evolve over time.
Aggregate capital is slowly decumulated until it reaches its new equilibrium value
while other variables adjust much faster. The tax rate jumps up immediately because
the government needs to start nancing the subsidies and the expansion of Medicaid.
After the rst period the tax sharply decreases and then slowly moves up until it reaches
its new steady-state value. This overshoot of the tax happens because at the start of
the reform there is still a lot of uninsured people and the government has to provide
consumption oor to the uninsured with large medical shocks. Once the number of
uninsured decreases the government spends less money to nance the consumption oor
(see also Table 5). The further increase in taxes happens because of the erosion of the
tax base due to a decline in the aggregate capital. The employment and uninsurance
rates adjust quickly to their new equilibrium values after the transition starts.
52Another possible consequence of the reform not reected in our model is the change in hospital
behavior. In particular, there is a view that hospitals will increase prices after the reform. This can
happen because sometimes hospitals overcharge private insurers in order to compensate for low Med-
icaid reimbursement rates, and since more people will be enrolled in Medicaid after the reform the
\extra"charge on private insurers can increase. However, according to the CBO's estimates the eect of
this cost-shifting will be minimal (CBO, 2009). First, based on the existing empirical evidence, the CBO
concludes that the amount of cost-shifting that currently exists is small. Second, even if the degree of
cost-shifting increases after the reform it will be oset by the decline in the number of uninsured since
this will signicantly decrease the amount of uncompensated care that hospitals provide.
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Figure 12: Transition of aggregate variables
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Figure 13: CEV of newborns during the transition period
Figure (13) plots consumption equivalent variation of newborns in each period during
the transition. People born immediately after the transition have the highest welfare gains
and each new generation has lower welfare. The welfare declines because the aggregate
capital gradually decreases and the tax rate increases.
F Welfare eects of the dierent versions of the re-
form
Figure (14) compares the average welfare gains (including the transition period) from
dierent versions of the reform for people with dierent productivity and health.53 The
reform with only community rating and high penalties results in signicantly lower welfare
gains than the reform with only redistribution for most people except those with high
education and high productivity. Most members of the later group lose from the reform
with only redistribution because it increases the tax burden while providing them with
little benets. The reform with only community rating with high penalties does not aect
the welfare of the healthy members of this group but increases welfare of the unhealthy
because they can benet from better risk-sharing in the individual market.
G The ESHI response to reform
When evaluating the welfare implications of the reform, we assumed that there is
no response from the rm oering ESHI. This section reevaluates the welfare eects of
the reform when this assumption is relaxed. In particular, we consider how the results
53In Figure (14) we omit the reform with only community rating because the only eect of this version
of the reform is the unraveling of the individual market.
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Figure 14: CEV (including the transition) for dierent versions of the reform for healthy (left panel)
and unhealthy (right panel). Productivity groups are dened the same way as in Figure 7
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change if in response to the reform rms oering ESHI decrease their contribution rate.
This experiment is motivated by the result in Gruber and McKnight (2003) who found
that expansion in Medicaid eligibility in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to a decline in
employers' contributions to health insurance premiums. Table 10 compares the welfare
eects of the reform if there is no change in the employer contribution rate ( ) to a case
when it decreases to 50%.54
CEV(%)
Low High
All education education
 does not change 0.64 1.43 0.51
 decreases to 50% 0.47 1.28 0.32
Table 10: Welfare eects of the reform under dierent assumptions on ESHI (welfare calculations
include the transition period)
When the reform induces rms to decrease the contribution rate, this mostly aects
people with high education: their CEV goes down from 0.51 to 0.32. For this educational
group the employer-based pool is a primary source of coverage. When the employer
contribution rate declines, it leads to a partial destruction of this pool because younger
people prefer to switch to the individual market where premiums are age-adjusted. This
increases the group premium and reduces the welfare of people relying on ESHI. For
people with lower educational attainment who rely less on ESHI, the welfare changes
much less. Because of this the overall welfare eects of the reform are still large and
positive despite a large decline in the employer contribution rate.
H Change in marginal taxes after the reform
Table 11 reports the change in marginal taxes after the reform.55 Because we assume
that the reform is nanced by increasing the progressivity of the income tax code, people
with high income face a larger increase in taxes than people with low income. For
example, people in the lowest income group face increase in taxes equal to 0.3% while
people in the highest income group have to pay on average 2.2% more in taxes.
54The scenario when an average employer's contribution rate decreases to 50% after the reform is
unlikely because the Bill requires employers whose workers face high group premiums to pay penalties.
However we construct this experiment to emphasize the directions of the welfare change.
55The reported numbers are average marginal taxes faced by people in each income category.
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Income categories Marginal tax
(% of FPL) Baseline Reform Change
<64 9.1 9.4 0.3
64-133 16.7 17.3 0.6
133-200 19.3 20.6 1.3
200-300 21.8 23.4 1.6
300-400 23.8 25.6 1.8
400-600 25.7 27.6 1.9
600-800 27.4 29.5 2.1
800-1000 28.5 30.7 2.2
Table 11: Average marginal tax rate in each income category before and after the reform
I Computational algorithm
We solved for the steady state equilibrium of the baseline model as follows.
1. Guess an initial interest rate r, price in the group insurance market p, the amount
the rm oering ESHI subtracts from the wage of their workers cE, tax parameter a2,
and bequest Beqe.
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2. Solve for the households' decision rules using backward induction. We evaluate the
value function for points outside the state space grid using a Piecewise Cubic Hermite
Interpolating Polynomial (PCHIP).
3. Given policy functions simulate the households distribution using a non-stochastic
method as in Young (2010).
4. Using the distribution of households and policy functions, check if market clearing
conditions and zero prot conditions for insurance rms hold, and government budget
balances. If not, update r, p, cE, a2, and Beqe, and repeat Steps 1-3.
The computation of the steady-state for the reformed economy is complicated by the
fact that we now need to compute additional 40 prices (for each working age) in the
individual community rated market. We modied the algorithm above by guessing these
40 prices at Step 1 and updating them at Step 4. The multiplicity of equilibriums in the
original reform is not likely to be an issue because individuals' insurance decisions are
less sensitive to the equilibrium price because of the subsidy scheme. When the reform
is implemented without subsidies we cannot rule out the multiplicity of equilibriums. In
this case we trap the price from below starting from a guess that is too low to be an
equilibrium. Then we update the price upwards slowly.
The algorithm to solve the equilibrium during the transition is similar to the above
56In general, insurance markets where rms are not allowed to risk-adjust premiums, as in the group
market, can have multiple equilibriums. However, because the major part of the premium is contributed
by the employer, people are less sensitive to the price of insurance and thus the multiplicity of equilibriums
becomes less of an issue. In particular, our equilibrium price tends to be invariant to the initial guess.
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algorithm, except that we need to guess the sequence of equilibrium variables in Step 1.
However, the computation is very costly and requires a large memory. Unlike a steady-
state, each generation living through the transition periods is dierent and we need to
keep track of each generation separately. Since it takes 85 periods to converge to a new
steady-state, and a household lives up to 75 periods, we have 160 dierent generations
living during the transition.
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